The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, which shocked the world on the morning of June 24, will most likely go down in history as one of the most important events since the turn of the century, reducing Europe’s political weight and its capacity to shape global affairs in a Post-Western World. Even the impact of a possible Trump presidency is unlikely to be as lasting as that of Brexit, since the latter will impact geopolitics permanently — Trump, on the other hand, will, if elected, be a temporary phenomenon.
And yet, a Trump victory in November could have a tremendous impact on global affairs, raising further doubts about the stability of the trans-Atlantic partnership, US security commitments in Asia, and reducing other states’ capacity to predict US foreign policy. Equally important, the rise of “post-truth” and identity politics on both sides of the Atlantic threatens to undermine the West’s key advantage vis-à-vis a rising China: its noisy but ultimately moderate and stability-producing democracy, its embrace of diversity and globalization, and its capacity to integrate migrants from all over the world. While the shift of power away from the Atlantic towards the Pacific is a largely irreversible macro-trend and can only be marginally affected by individuals, two momentous victories for anti-globalization populists in both the UK and the US could accelerate a tendency that would otherwise only materialize later — namely, the erosion of US influence and the complex renegotiation of its status and its hegemonic privileges.
Several of Trump’s ideas are scary. Yet rather than specific Trumpian ideas in themselves, what would most affect global order if he won is widespread uncertainty resulting from a complete lack of policy coherence — just like in the case of Brexit, which generated ample confusion about how exactly things will play out between Great Britain and Europe in the realms of trade, migration and more general policy coordination. Just like the financial crisis in 2008, which originated in the United States and which created profound uncertainty about the stability of global financial order, Donald Trump in the White House would essentially put a risk premium on all geopolitical considerations, requiring even long-term US allies to constantly have an alternative plan ready to be pulled out of the drawer.
Naturally, there are ways in which an incoming President Trump could seek to assuage such fears, for example by appointing a moderate and experienced politician as secretary of state and providing him with ample policy autonomy. Still, considering the many contradictory ideas articulated during the campaign so far, even Russia and China, the only two countries which may root for Trump given his criticism of US attempts to spread democracy, are wary.
As The Economist points out,
Moscow clearly prefers Mr Trump, largely because it hates Hillary Clinton’s interventionist foreign-policy views. But many Russian officials are worried by the disruptive potential of a Trump presidency. “If he ends up in the White House, does it mean he’ll actually begin to fulfil all his chaotic promises?” asks Valery Garbuzov, head of the Russian Academy of Science’s Institute for the USA and Canada.
While Putin may enjoy the attention given to Russia in the US campaign, I still believe his foreign policy advisors are likely to privately hope for a Clinton victory — the price of unpredictability is simply too high. In China, too, some observers sympathize with Trump and recognize that Clinton is a tough negotiator and perhaps more hawkish and direct than Barack Obama. And still, in the end, the foreign policy establishment in Beijing will prefer Clinton, “the devil we know”, to somebody who comes across as strikingly unpredictable. Lou Jiwei, Chinese finance minister, described Mr Trump as an “irrational type” when he suggested new tariffs on Chinese goods.
That is remarkable given the ample evidence that Hillary Clinton could be expected to be tougher on China than Barack Obama. ”Every Chinese will say privately they really don’t like her”, a policy maker observes. As the Financial Times writes, “She has always been hard on China since her first visit in 1995,” says Chu Shulong, an international relations expert at Tsinghua University. Indeed, she is wedded to many ideas (based on the strategy of liberal hegemony) that have produced disastrous results, such as the US invasion of Iraq, which she supported, and in several ways her policy ideas may be similar to those of George W. Bush, a vigorous supporter of spreading democracy, if necessary by force. As Stephen Walt points out, Hillary Clinton’s foreign-policy machine is ”the living embodiment of the mainstream Foreign Policy Establishment.” For Beijing and Moscow, that also means they’d have to deal with negotiators they have known for years, with only limited potential for unpleasant surprises or time spent to establish new personal relationships.
The fact that not a single country wholeheartedly supports the Trump candidacy makes clear how deep-seated worries in capitals around the world are about how the former reality TV star’s potential to negatively affect the stability of global order. While Trump has articulated some sensible points regarding the shortcomings of contemporary foreign policy (applying to all US governments since the end of the Cold War), his many other shortcomings make this election not about Clinton’s ideas vs. Trump’s ideas, but about predictability vs. unpredictability. That is also due to the Republican candidate’s views about economic policy. As Walt writes,
Trump’s views on international economics reflect a protectionist outlook that was discredited a couple of centuries ago. Tearing up the North American Free Trade Agreement or leaving the World Trade Organization would not restore American manufacturing or make the country “great” again; it would instead be a body blow to the United States and the world economy and could quite possibly trigger another global recession.
Just like with foreign policy, Trump could leave the economy to an experienced politician to assuage such fears. Still, the risk to the global economy would still be considerable.
All this shows that even those critical of the ideas that have guided US foreign policy over the past years and those who believe the end of unipolarity is not necessarily a bad thing (such as myself), will have to hold their nose and hope for a Clinton victory on November 8. The alternative is almost certainly far worse.
Read also:
The death of the US pivot to Asia?
China’s Grand Strategy to Become No. 1
The Politics of China’s Amazonian Railway
Photo credit: Ross D. Franklin/ AP
