Book review: “Der Abstieg des Westens. Europa in der neuen Weltordnung des 21. Jahrhunderts”. [in German]. By Joscka Fischer. Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2018. U$ 29.36 (hardcover), www.amazon.com
Things will never be the same again for the West, Joschka Fischer, Germany’s former Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, writes in his new book “The Decline of the West”. To him, Brexit and Trump symbolize a profound, irreversible shift that poses an existential threat to both Europe and global order as a whole: “If Trump no longer supports it, today’s global order will no longer work.” Europe, he recognizes, will be most affected by the coming changes. For years, Fischer admits, Europeans were comfortable operating in the slipstream of US leadership, often criticizing US foreign policy, but always sure that Washington would come to the rescue should things go wrong. “The time of transatlantic solidarity is over, and it won’t return after Trump”, Fischer predicts.
The former Foreign Minister himself made ample use of Europe’s privileged position, most famously during his opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, which is today seen as one of the Schröder government’s most far-sighted foreign policy decisions. Yet he is acutely aware of the risks the end of US security guarantees pose to Europe: “Unlike the United States, Europe is not a continental island protected by two oceans, but the western part of the massive Eurasian landmass.”
Adapting to a new, more Asia-centric global order without unconditional security guarantees from the United States will be particularly hard for Europe, Fischer warns. The author writes that while everybody knew the center of power would eventually shift to Asia again, the West’s triumph in the late 20th century created a situation in which “the past simply looked nicer than an ugly future.” He laments Europe’s Western-centrism and a general unawareness of the rapid changes in Asia. Another reason for the delay in grasping the new reality is that while the Soviet Union collapsed at once, the West is declining slowly, “step by step”. He predicts years of tensions within the West, between nationalists and internationalists, between those who look into the past and those who look into the future, and between defenders of an unsustainable status quo and those with the courage to participate in the creation of a new order. Until recently sure of its permanent triumph, the West, according to Fischer, is neither politically nor mentally prepared for the coming transition.
Interestingly enough, Fischer emphasizes above all internal weaknesses in the West to explain why its leading role in global affairs is set to end — “US-American triumphalism” and “European passivity” are the major culprits. That overlooks that a Western-centric order would end even with Hillary Clinton in the White House and without Brexit. Looking into the future, Fischer also questions whether all international actors are rational, and uses Russia as an example, which, he argues, suffers “phantom pain”, saying it hasn’t overcome the trauma of its collapsed empire. Given Fischer’s extensive policy experience, that is somewhat surprising — one may criticize or condemn Russian foreign policy, but it certainly follows are relatively clear rationale.
After analyzing the West’s internal weaknesses, Fischer turns to China, whose rise he regards as largely inevitable. He argues that China cannot compete with the Untied States in the realm of soft power, suggesting that the cost Beijing will have to maintain alliances is higher than for the US, which European powers in particular accepted voluntarily. While an attractive culture may have helped, hard power aspects have almost certainly played a greater role. The author sees China’s Belt and Road Initiative as transformative and predicts, interestingly enough, that the two countries most negatively impact by it are not the United States, but fellow BRICS members India and Russia, who will see China’s dominance in Asia as an incursion into their backyards. Fischer also predicts that China’s rise will increase tensions with Islam, given that it will be increasingly influential from Central Asia to the Middle East.
What should Europe’s role be in such a world? Fischer is remarkably pessimistic when it comes to the old continent’s outlook. Europe, he says, excelled in 20th century technologies, but is far behind when it comes to 21st century technologies. A lack of anything comparable to Silicon Valley or Shenzen, and a shortage of venture capital, he writes, will increase Europe’s strategic dependence — a remarkable statement for a former left-wing politician. Rather than actively shaping global order, Fischer suggests Europe should think hard about how to operate in a bipolar order led by Washington and Beijing.
Yet Fischer considers nationalism as an even greater threat to Europe’s future. The alternative to pooled sovereignty, he predicts, is “foreign control” (Fremdbestimmung). The more national states will embrace nationalist tendencies, the weaker Europe will become. Recognizing that public opinion in several European nations will make deepening the political integration difficult, he advocates for a smaller group of countries taking the lead — aware that this solution is “not ideal”, but a “defensible compromise”. Macron, Fischer says, represents a window of opportunity, considering that it is far from clear whether he can win reelection a few years from now. Stronger integration between France and Germany should be locked in as long as it is possible.
While the most approximate English translation of Joschka Fischer’s new book is similar to Oswald Spengler’s work published exactly one hundred years ago, the original title in German is less dramatic: While Spengler used the term Untergang (lit. downfall or sinking), Abstieg (lit. decline or relegation) is more nuanced, and does not imply that the West will cease the exist. And yet, Fischer’s account is full of doomsday images. The crisis of Western democracy, the author insists, is a Niedergangsphänomen, a phenomenon of decline, and he sees China’s “digital leninism” as a genuine threat.
The book’s upside it that it serves as a wake-up call to rethink both the European project in the age of resurgent nationalism, Trump and Brexit. His focus on the need to debate Europe’s role in a more China-centric world is equally laudable. On the negative side, Fischer often remains at the surface and refrains from providing more specific policy advice.
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