The 10th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg: An analysis

“It’s time to bid farewell to the Brics”, the Financial Times‘s Philipp Stevens declared in 2011. A year later, his colleague Martin Wolf, one of the world’s leading foreign affairs columnists, went further, arguing

The BRICS are not a group. (…) These countries have basically nothing in common whatsoever, except that they are called BRICS and they are quite important. But in all other respects, their interests and values, political systems, and objectives are substantially diverse. So there’s no reason whatsoever to expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world (…).

Indeed, from a Western perspective, the BRICS grouping looked just too different from the G7 to make sense or offer anything meaningful to its member countries. Over the past decade, critics from Brussels, London and Washington never tired to question the BRICS grouping’s usefulness — after all, they pointed out, Brazil, India and South Africa were vibrant democracies, while China and Russia were authoritarian regimes. Some were commodity importers, some exported them. There was even an unresolved border conflict between two of its largest members. And so on. (When I discussed the topic with a Russian senior diplomat at a meeting in Moscow, he half-jokingly replied “Western observers overlook something all the BRICS countries have in common: we are all unique.”)

Yet as the leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa met for a historic tenth time last week, The Economist, which had long insisted in the grouping’s irrelevance, conceded that the BRICS were ”surprisingly good at keeping its promises”. The newspaper had even made the effort to read the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration, finding “102 paragraphs containing an as yet uncounted number of pledges. They cover everything from settling trade disputes and securing Syria to making more movies together.” Slowly, Western observers are beginning to study the grouping in earnest. Over the past two years, two books have been published on BRICS with leading Western university presses. They provide excellent analyses on what the grouping means for global order [reviews are forthcoming on this blog]. However, neither one of them – The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft by Roberts, Armijo, and Katada, and Rising Powers and Foreign Policy Revisionism Understanding BRICS Identity and Behavior Through Time, by Thies and Nieman – assess the grouping’s efforts to strengthen intra-BRICS ties, be it by discussing ways to reduce non-tariff barriers to facilitate trade or by organizing yearly summits for each member country’s national security advisor.

Yet it is precisely that what matters most to policy makers in Brasília, New Delhi and Beijing: ties among member countries have undergone a silent transformation since the group’s inception, providing numerous advantages that attract little attention elsewhere — see a more detailed analysis on specific areas of cooperation below. The grouping, however has been relevant on the foreign policy front, too. For Russia, the BRICS grouping proved to be a diplomatic life raft since it suffered diplomatic isolation after the annexation of Crimea. At the time, a joint statement criticizing Australia for suggesting to exclude Russia from the G20 made it clear that the West would not succeed in bringing the entire international community into line in its attempt to isolate Russia. For South Africa, it provided a massive status boost on the international stage, providing it unprecedented access to the other countries’ policy elites. The meeting in Johannesburg was like a gift from heaven for South Africa’s new President Ramaphosa, allowing him to look presidential ahead of a potentially tricky election next year. In addition, hosting numerous leaders from around the world in South Africa — not only from the BRICS countries, but also from countries like Turkey and Argentina — allowed Zuma’s successor to lay out his strategy on how to get South Africa back on track. It is no coincidence that it is in South Africa that BRICS membership is most firmly part of the public debate, with frequent op-ed in major newspapers arguing for or against it (including, among others, a wonderfully provocative piece in the Mail and Guardian by Patrick Bond, a Marxist scholar).

For India, BRICS provides an additional opportunity to discuss important geopolitical concerns with Russia and China, as well as share its particular concerns about terrorism to a wider audience that would otherwise know little about it. In the Johannesburg Declaration, the term “terrorism” appears thirteen times. For China, the grouping is crucial to forge strategic ties with key partners in each region of the world. More importantly, seen from Beijing, BRICS is a key building bloc of a much larger project to adapt global order to a more Asia-centric world. Brazil, too, is a beneficiary of the BRICS, even though its public debate, still painfully Western-centric both on the left and the right, is still lagging behind in discussing its role in the grouping. Traditionally unaware of Asian affairs in general and the opportunities a more Asia-centric world offers, Brazil’s participation in the BRICS grouping — which now involves more than seventy yearly meetings in areas ranging from national security and public health to education and innovation — is has helped it broaden a debate about a much-needed strategic reorientation towards Asia, involving not only the government, but the private sector, the media, academia, and society as a whole.

There are five key issues in the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration that deserve special mention:

1) The BRICS seek to project stability and predictability in a rules-based order threatened by US President Trump

As expected, the grouping sought to contrast recent US policies vis-à-vis global rules and norms and project the grouping as a guardian of order, embracing globalization and recognizing the need to take action against climate change. The BRICS declare in paragraph 8,

We recommit our support for multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in international affairs and uphold fair, just and equitable international order based on the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, respect for international law, promoting democracy and the rule of law in international relations, and to address common traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

In paragraph 21, the grouping calls “upon all countries to fully implement the Paris Agreement adopted under the principles of the UNFCCC (…).”

In paragraph 63, the leaders say they “underscore the importance of an open world economy, enabling all countries and peoples to share the benefits of globalisation, which should be inclusive and support sustainable development and prosperity of all countries. We call on all WTO members to abide by WTO rules and honour their commitments in the multilateral trading system.” Of course, this is not entirely genuine. BRICS countries have misgivings about Chinese trade practices, and they have been voiced in Johannesburg behind closed doors. But rhetoric about rules and norms matter, as committing to them frames the debate in a way that the cost of deviation increases. Particularly for China, this is strategically useful. Donald Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy, most recently visible in the realms of nuclear proliferation and trade, dramatically reduce the extent of global scrutiny China faces these days, be it for its mercantilistic trade policies or domestic challenges. Quite remarkably, Xi Jinping has so far won the battle of narratives against Trump, and the Chinese leader is by many regarded as a global stabilizer and defender of global rules and norms, while Trump is seen as a source of risk.

2. The BRICS grouping is about far more than the yearly presidential summits

While many analysts will base their assessment of the BRICS grouping as a whole on the Johannesburg Declaration, they overlook that the yearly leaders’ summits are merely the most visible element of the rotating BRICS presidency that each country holds for one year (South Africa will take over in 2018 and host the next summit). In that sense, the BRICS grouping differs from other outfits such as the G7, which possess a far lower degree of institutionalization. The declaration lists 72 BRICS-related meetings that took place during South Africa’s BRICS presidency (see the declaration’s annex) ranging from agriculture, national security, health and international finance (see also: BRICS: There Is More Than Just the Summits). While several initiatives have not produced tangible results, others (such as previous consultations prior to key decisions regarding the World Bank and the IMF) have become standard practice. While the depth of intra-BRICS ties remains limited (except for everyone’s ties to China), it is fair to say that the grouping has helped, over the past decade, to slowly reduce the mutual ignorance that has shaped ties between member countries. [The complete and updated list of intra-BRICS activities over the past 10 years will be available in the Second Edition of BRICS and the Future of Global Order, to be published in 2019].

Here are the Ministerial Meetings that took place this year:

Meeting of BRICS Finance Deputies – 17 to 20 March (Buenos Aires)
Meeting of the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors – 18 to 20 April (Washington, DC)
Meeting of BRICS Finance Deputies – 18 to 20 April (Washington, DC)
Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Environmental Affairs – 18 May (Durban)
Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – 4 June (Pretoria)
Meeting of BRICS Head of Revenue Authorities – 18 to 21 June 2018 (Johannesburg)
8th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development – 19 to 22 June (Mpumalanga)
8th Meeting of National Security Advisors – 28 to 29 June 2018 (Durban)
BRICS Energy Ministers – 28 to 29 June (Gauteng)
Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Disaster Management – 29 June to 1 July (East London)
6th Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation – 3 July (Durban)
3rd Meeting of BRICS Industry Ministers – 4 July (Gauteng)
8th Meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers – 5 July (Magaliesburg)
Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education – 10 July (Cape Town)
Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors – 19 to 22 July (Argentina)
8th Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Health – 20 July (Durban)

3. The Johannesburg Declaration points to broader cooperation in areas related to the 4th Industrial Revolution

The BRICS have established the so-called Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) to discuss the challenges and opportunities that will emerge in the context of robotics, artificial intelligence, blockchain, nanotechnology, quantum computing, biotechnology, The Internet of Things, 3D printing and autonomous vehicles — phenomena sometimes jointly described as the 4th Industrial Revolution (see paragraph 56). In this context, the BRICS countries have established the “BRICS Networks of Science Parks, Technology Business Incubators and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises” — while it remains to be seen to what extent such cooperation can work in practice, there is no doubt South Africa, India, Russia and Brazil in particular can benefit from greater cooperation in an area where China has taken the global lead. In paragraph 73, the grouping welcomes the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Collaborative Research on Distributed Ledger and Blockchain Technology in the Context of the Development of the Digital Economy.

4. Brazil gets a New Development Bank (NDB) regional office

The NDB is expanding its operations. The Johannesburg Declaration announces the creation of the Project Preparation Fund and welcomes the upcoming establishment of the Americas Regional Office in São Paulo, Brazil, which, alongside the Africa Regional Centre, will help the NDB consolidate its presence in those continents (paragraph 76). The document refers to the NDB’s Board of Governors’ discussions on Innovative Approaches for Development Finance at its 3rd Annual Meeting on 28-29 May in Shanghai, China, that focused on the NDB’s future development in the changing global environment. The physical presence of the NDB in Brazil is likely to help the institution gain more visibility in the country where the institution remains little known, even in the foreign policy community.

5. The grouping promises to do more to overcome intra-BRICS obstacles

In 2017, out of 135 million Chinese travelers worldwide, only 1 in every 2,200 came to Brazil — despite Brazil being widely known in China, and largely seen as an attractive destination. Lack of initiative and vision, bureaucracy and limited tourism infrastructure in Brazil are to blame. In the same way, the number of Chinese tourists traveling to other BRICS countries remains far below the number of those visiting Europe and the United States. The establishment of the BRICS Working Group on Tourism is thus good news. As the BRICS announce in paragraph 85, ”the BRICS Tourism work stream will exchange knowledge, experience and best practices in the areas of travel trade, air connectivity, tourism infrastructure, culture and medical tourism, barriers to tourism marketing, tourism safety and support – financial, insurance and medical. We note with satisfaction that Intra-BRICS Tourism has grown despite the global economic downturn.”

While many observers still regard the BRICS Summit through an unhelpful ‘West vs. rest’ lens, it will become increasingly clear that successful intra-BRICS cooperation is to be welcomed and has a positive impact on global order. To begin with, making use of the untapped potential of trade between BRICS countries will be key to avoid what Larry Summers calls “secular stagnation” and enhance trade between countries that are not as reluctant to embrace globalization as many Western powers. In addition, more effective cooperation between India and China will be crucial to avoid geopolitical tensions or even armed conflict in Asia in the coming years and decades — a scenario that would cause a global recession, considering how much the world economy is centered around Asia. Five countries alone, of course, are not enough to address such a monumental and long-term challenge. But promoting intra-BRICS cooperation is certainly a step in the right direction.

Temer’s Final BRICS Summit Is a Golden Opportunity for Brazil (Americas Quarterly)

New Development Banks as Horizontal International Bypasses: Towards a Parallel Order?